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Abstract—This paper develops a novel framework for sharing
secret keys using existing Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ)
protocols. Our approach exploits the multi-path nature of the
wireless environment to hide the key from passive eavesdroppers.
The proposed framework does not assume the availability of
any prior channel state information (CSI) and exploits only
the one bit ACK/NACK feedback from the legitimate receiver.
Compared with earlier approaches, the main innovation lies
in the distribution of key bits among multiple ARQ frames.
Interestingly, this idea allows for achieving a positive secrecy rate
even when the eavesdropper experiences more favorable channel
conditions, on average, than the legitimate receiver. In the sequel,
we characterize the information theoretic limits of the proposed
schemes, develop low complexity explicit implementations, and
conclude with numerical results that validate our theoretical
claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication, because of its broadcast nature,
is vulnerable to eavesdropping and other security attacks.
Therefore, pushing wireless networking to its full potential
requires finding solutions to its intrinsic security problems.
In this paper, we consider a physical layer-based scheme
to share a secret key between two users (Alice and Bob)
communicating over a fading channel in the presence of a
passive eavesdropper (Eve). The private key can then be used
to secure further exchange of information.
Arguably, the recent flurry of interest on wireless physical
layer secrecy was inspired by Wyner’s wiretap channel [1], [2].
Under the assumption that Eve’s channel is a degraded version
of Bob’s, Wyner showed that perfectly secure communication
is possible by hiding the message in the additional noise level
seen by Eve. The effect of slow fading on the secrecy capacity
was studied later. In particular, by appropriately distributing
the message across different fading realizations, it was shown
that the multi-user diversity gain can be harnessed to enhance
the secrecy capacity, e.g. [3], [8]. Another frame of work [4]
proposed using the well-known Hybrid ARQ protocols to
facilitate the exchange of secure messages between Alice and
Bob.
This paper extends this line of work in two ways. First,
by distributing the key bits over multiple ARQ frames, we
establish the achievability of a vanishing probability of secrecy
outages [4] at the expense of a larger delay. Interestingly,
using this approach, a non-zero perfectly secure key rate is
achievable even when Eve is experiencing a more favorable av-
erage signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than Bob (unlike the scheme
Fig. 1. System model involves a legitimate receiver, Bob, with a feedback
channel to the sender, Alice. Eve is a passive eavesdropper. We assume block
fading channels that are independent of each other.
proposed in [4]). Second, we develop explicit constructions for
secrecy ARQ coding that enjoy low implementation complex-
ity. The proposed scheme utilizes the ARQ protocol to create
an erasure wiretap channel and then uses known ideas from
coset coding to construct optimal codes for this channel [5]–
[7].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Our system
model is detailed in Section II. Section III provides the
information theoretic analysis of our model. Explicit secrecy
coding schemes are developed in Section IV. In Section V,
we present numerical results. Finally, Section VI summarizes
our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Our model, shown in Figure 1, assumes one transmitter
(Alice), one legitimate receiver (Bob) and one passive eaves-
dropper (Eve), all equipped with single antenna. We adopt a
block fading model in which the channel is assumed to be fixed
over one coherence interval and changes randomly from one
interval to the next. In order to obtain rigorous information
theoretic results, we consider the scenario of asymptotically
large coherence intervals and allow for sharing the key across
an asymptotically large number of those intervals. The finite
delay case will be considered in Section IV. In any particular
interval, the signals received by Bob and Eve are respectively
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given by,
y(i, j) = gb(j)x(i, j) + wb(i, j), (1)
z(i, j) = ge(j)x(i, j) + we(i, j), (2)
where x(i, j) is the i th transmitted symbol in the j th block,
y(i, j) is the i th received symbol by Bob in the j th block,
z(i, j) is the i th received symbol by Eve in the j th block, gb(j)
and ge(j) are the complex block channel gains from Alice to
Bob and Eve, respectively. Moreover, wb(i, j) and we(i, j) are
the zero-mean, unit-variance additive white complex Gaussian
noise at Bob and Eve, respectively. We denote the block
fading power gains of the main and eavesdropper channels
by hb = |gb(j)|2 and he = |ge(j)|2. We do not assume any
prior knowledge about the channel state information at Alice.
However, Bob is assumed to know gb(j) and Eve is assumed
to know both gb(j) and ge(j). We impose the following short-
term average power constraint
E
(|x(i, j)|2) ≤ P¯ . (3)
Our model only allows for one bit of ARQ feedback
between Alice and Bob. Each ARQ epoch is assumed to
be contained in one coherence interval (i.e., fixed channel
gains) and that different epochs correspond to independent
coherence intervals (the same assumptions as [4]). We denote
the constant rate used in each transmission frame by R0
bits/channel use. The transmitted packets are assumed to carry
a perfect error detection mechanism that Bob (and Eve) used
to determine whether the packet has been received correctly
or not. Based on the error check, Bob sends back to Alice
an ACK/NACK bit, through a public and error-free feedback
channel. Eve is assumed to be passive (i.e., can not transmit);
an assumption which can be justified in several practical
settings. To minimize Bob’s receiver complexity, we adopt
the memoryless decoding assumption implying that frames
received in error are discarded and not used to aid in future
decoding attempts.
III. INFORMATION THEORETIC FOUNDATION
In our setup, Alice wishes to share a secret key W ∈ W =
{1, 2, · · · ,M} with Bob. This key can be used for securing
future data transmission. To transmit this key, Alice and Bob
use an (M,m) code consisting of : 1) a stochastic encoder
fm(.) at Alice that maps the key w to a codeword xm ∈ Xm,
2) a decoding function φ: Ym → W which is used by Bob
to recover the key. The codeword is partitioned into a blocks
each of n1 symbols where m = an1. In this section, we focus
on the asymptotic scenario where a→∞ and n1 →∞.
Alice starts with a random selection of the first block of n1
symbols. Upon reception, Bob attempts to decode this block.
If successful, it sends an ACK bit to Alice who moves ahead
and makes a random choice of the second n1 and sends it
to Bob. Here, Alice must make sure that the concatenation
of the two blocks belong to a valid codeword. As shown
in the sequel, this constraint is easily satisfied. If an error
was detected, then Bob sends a NACK bit to Alice. Here, we
assume that the error detection mechanism is perfect which is
justified by the fact that n1 →∞. In this case, Alice replaces
the first block of n1 symbols with another randomly chosen
block and transmits it. The process then repeats until Alice
and Bob agree on a sequence of a blocks, each of length n1
symbols, corresponding to the key.
The code construction must allow for reliable decoding at
Bob while hiding the key from Eve. It is clear that the proposed
protocol exploits the error detection mechanism to make sure
that both Alice and Bob agree on the key (i.e., ensures reliable
decoding). What remains is the secrecy requirement which is
measured by the equivocation rate Re defined as the entropy
rate of the transmitted key conditioned on the intercepted
ACKs or NACKs and the channel outputs at Eve, i.e.,
Re
∆=
1
n
H(W |Zn,Kb, Gbb, Gbe) , (4)
where n is the number of symbols transmitted to exchange
the key (including the symbols in the discarded blocks due to
decoding errors, b = a nm , K
b = {K(1), · · · ,K(b)} denotes
sequence of ACK/NACK bits, Gbb and G
b
e are the sequences
of channel coefficients seen by Bob and Eve in the b blocks,
and Zn = {Z(1), · · · , Z(n)} denotes Eve’s channel outputs
in the n symbol intervals. We limit our attention to the perfect
secrecy scenario, which requires the equivocation rate Re to
be arbitrarily close to the key rate. The secrecy rate Rs is said
to be achievable if for any  > 0, there exists a sequence of
codes (2nRs ,m) such that for any m ≥ m(), we have
Re =
1
n
H(W |Zn,Kb, Gbb, Gbe) ≥ Rs −  (5)
and the key rate for a given input distribution is defined as
the maximum achievable perfect secrecy rate with this distri-
bution. The following result characterizes this rate, assuming
a Gaussian input distribution
Theorem 1: For the memoryless ARQ , the perfect secrecy
rate for Gaussian inputs for a given transmit power P is given
by:
Cs = max
R0,P≤P¯
{Pr(R0 ≤ log(1+hbP ))E[R0−log(1+heP )]+},
(6)
where [x]+ = max(0, x). All logarithms in this paper are
taken to base 2, unless otherwise stated.
Proof: Here, we only give a sketch of the proof of
achievability. Due to space limitations, the converse will be
deferred to the journal paper version. The proof is given for
a fixed average power P ≤ P¯ and transmission rate R0. The
key rate is then obtained by the appropriate maximization.
Let Rs = Cs − δ for some small δ > 0 and R = R0 − .
We first generate all binary sequences {V} of length mR and
then independently assign each of them randomly to one of
2nRs groups, according to a uniform distribution. This ensures
that any of the sequences are equally likely to be within any
of the groups. Each secret message w ∈ {1, · · · , 2nRs} is
then assigned a group V(w). We then generate a Gaussian
codebook consisting of 2n1(R0−) codewords, each of length
n1 symbols. The codebooks are then revealed to Alice, Bob,
and Eve. To transmit the codeword, Alice first selects a random
group v(i) of n1R bits, and then transmits the corresponding
codeword, drawn from the chosen Gaussian codebook. If Alice
receives an ACK bit from Bob, both are going to store this
group of bits and selects another group of bits to send in
the next coherence interval in the same manner. If a NACK
was received, this group of bits is discarded and another is
generated in the same manner. This process is repeated till both
Alice and Bob have shared the same key w corresponding to
nRs bits. We observe that the channel coding theorem implies
the existence of a Gaussian codebook where the fraction of
successfully decoded frames is given by
m
n
= Pr(R0 ≤ log(1 + hbP )), (7)
as n1 → ∞. The equivocation rate at the eavesdropper can
then be lower bounded as follows.
nRe = H(W |Zn,Kn, Gbb, Gbe)
(a)
= H(W |Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H(W,Zm|Gab , Gae)−H(Zm|Gab , Gae)
= H(W,Zm, Xm|Gab , Gae)−H(Zm|Gab , Gae)
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H(Xm|Gab , Gae) +H(W,Zm|Xm, Gab , Gae)
−H(Zm|Gab , Gae)−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
≥ H(Xm|Gab , Gae) +H(Zm|Xm, Gab , Gae)
−H(Zm|Gab , Gae)−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H(Xm|Gab , Gae)− I(Zm;Xm|Gab , Gae)
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
= H(Xm|Zm, Gab , Gae)−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
(b)
=
a∑
j=1
H(X(j)|Z(j), Gb(j), Ge(j))
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
(c)
≥
∑
j∈Nm
H(X(j)|Z(j), Gb(j), Ge(j))
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
=
∑
j∈Nm
[H(X(j)|Gb(j), Ge(j))
−I(X(j);Z(j)|Gb(j), Ge(j))]
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
≥
∑
j∈Nm
n1 [R0 − log (1 + he(j)P )− ]
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
≥
a∑
j=1
n1
{
[R0 − log (1 + he(j)P )]+ − 
}
−H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)
(d)
= nCs −H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae)−m. (8)
In the above derivation, (a) results from the independent choice
of the codeword symbols transmitted in each ARQ frame
which does not allow Eve to benefit from the observations
corresponding to the NACKed frames, (b) follows from the
memoryless property of the channel and the independence
of the X(j)’s, (c) is obtained by removing all those terms
which correspond to the coherence intervals j /∈ Nm, where
Nm = {j ∈ {1, · · · , a} : hb(j) > he(j)}, and (d) follows
from the ergodicity of the channel as n,m → ∞. Now
we show that the term H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae) vanishes as
n1 → ∞ by using a list decoding argument. In this list
decoding, at coherence interval j, the wiretapper first con-
structs a list Lj such that x(j) ∈ Lj if (x(i), z(i)) are
jointly typical. Let L = L1 × L2 × · · · × La. Given w, the
wiretapper declares that xˆm = (xm) was transmitted, if xˆm
is the only codeword such that xˆm ∈ B(w)∩L, where B(w)
is the set of codewords corresponding to the message w. If
the wiretapper finds none or more than one such sequence,
then it declares an error. Hence, there are two types of error
events: 1) E1: the transmitted codeword xmt is not in L, 2)
E2: ∃xm 6= xmt such that xm ∈ B(w) ∩ L. Thus the error
probability Pr(xˆm 6= xmt ) = Pr(E1 ∪ E2) ≤ Pr(E1) + Pr(E2).
Based on the Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP), we
know that Pr(E1) ≤ 1. In order to bound Pr(E2), we first
bound the size of Lj . We let
φj(x(j)|z(j)) =
{
1, (x(j), z(j)) are jointly typical,
0, otherwise. (9)
Now
E{‖Lj‖} = E
∑
x(j)
φj(x(j)|z(j))

≤ E
1 + ∑
x(j) 6=xt(j)
φj(x(j)|z(j))

≤ 1 +
∑
x(j)6=xt(j)
E {φj(x(j)|z(j))}
≤ 1 + 2n1[R0−log(1+he(j)P )−]
≤ 2n1
“
[R0−log(1+he(j)P )−]++ 1n1
”
(10)
Hence
E{‖L‖} =
a∏
j=1
{‖Lj‖} = 2
aP
j=1
n1
“
[R0−log(1+hE(j)P )−]++ 1n1
”
(11)
Pr(E2) ≤ E
 ∑
xm∈L,xm 6=xmt
Pr(xm ∈ B(w))

(a)
≤ E{‖L‖2−nRs} (12)
≤ 2−nRs2
aP
j=1
n1
“
[R0−log(1+he(j)P )−]++ 1n1
”
≤ 2
−n
 
Rs− 1c
aP
j=1
“
[R0−log(1+he(j)P )−]++ 1n1
”!
,
= 2
−n
 
Rs− 1c
aP
j=1
“
[R0−log(1+he(j)P )]++ 1n1
”
+
|Nm|
c
!
,
where (a) follows from the uniform distribution of the code-
words in B(w). Now as n1 →∞ and a→∞, we get
Pr(E2) ≤ 2−n(Cs−δ−Cs+a) = 2−n(c−δ),
where c = Pr(hb > he). Thus, by choosing  > (δ/c), the
error probability Pr(E2) → 0 as n → ∞. Now using Fano’s
inequality, we get
H(Xm|W,Zm, Gab , Gae) ≤ nδn → 0 as m,n→∞.
Combining this with (8), we get the desired result.
A few remarks are now in order
1) It is intuitively pleasing that the secrecy key rate in
(6) is the product of the probability of success at
Bob and the expected value of the additional mutual
information gleaned by Bob, as compared to Eve, in
those successfully decoded frames.
2) It is clear from (6) that a positive secret key rate is
achievable under very mild conditions on the channels
experienced by Bob and Eve. More precisely, unlike
the approach proposed in [4], Theorem 1 establishes
the achievability of a positive perfect secrecy rate by
appropriately exploiting the ARQ feedback even when
Eve’s average SNR is higher than that of Bob.
3) Theorem 1 characterizes the fundamental limit on secret
key sharing and not message transmission. The differ-
ence between the two scenarios stems from the fact that
the message is known to Alice before starting the trans-
mission of the first block whereas Alice and Bob can
defer the agreement on the key till the last successfully
decoded block. This observation was exploited by our
approach in making Eve’s observations of the frames
discarded by Bob, due to failure in decoding, useless.
4) We stress the fact that our approach does not require
any prior knowledge about the channel state information.
The only assumption is that the public feedback channel
is authenticated and only Bob can send over it.
5) The achievability of (6) hinges on a random binning
argument which only establishes the existence of a cod-
ing scheme that achieves the desired result. Our result,
however, stops short of explicitly finding such optimal
coding scheme and characterizing its encoding/decoding
complexity. This observation motivates the development
of the explicit secrecy coding scheme in the next section.
6) The perfect secrecy constraint imposed in (5) ensures
that an eavesdropper with unlimited computational re-
sources can not obtain any information about the key.
In most practical scenarios, however, the eavesdropper
is only equipped with limited computational power. The
proposed scheme in the following section leverages this
fact in transforming our ARQ secret sharing problem
into an erasure-wiretap channel.
IV. EXPLICIT SECRECY CODING SCHEMES
Inspired by the information theoretic results presented ear-
lier, this section develops explicit secrecy coding schemes
Fig. 2. Erasure-wiretap channel equivalent model.
that allow for sharing keys using the underlying memoryless
ARQ protocol. The proposed schemes strive to minimize
encoding/decoding complexity at the expense of a minimal
price in performance efficiency. We proceed in three steps.
The first step replaces the random binning construction, used
in the achievability proof of Theorem 1, with an explicit coset
coding scheme for the erasure-wiretap channel. As shown next,
the erasure-wiretap channel is created by the ACK/NACK
feedback and accounts for the computational complexity avail-
able to Eve. In the second step, we limit the decoding
delay by distributing the key bits over only a finite number
of ARQ frames. Finally, we replace the capacity achieving
Gaussian channel code with practical coding schemes in the
third step. Overall, our three-step approach allows for a nice
performance-vs-complexity tradeoff.
The perfect secrecy requirement used in the information the-
oretic analysis does not impose any limits on Eve’s decoding
complexity. The idea now is to exploit the finite complexity
available at Eve in simplifying the secrecy coding scheme.
To illustrate the idea, let’s first assume that Eve can only
afford maximum likelihood (ML) decoding. Hence, successful
decoding at Eve is only possible when
R0 ≤ log(1 + heP ), (13)
for a given transmit power level P . Now, using the idealized
error detection mechanism, Eve will be able to identify and
erase the frames decoded in error resulting in an erasure
probability
 = Pr(R0 > log(1 + heP )). (14)
In practice, Eve may be able to go beyond the performance
of the ML decoder. For example, Eve can generate a list
of candidate codewords and then use the error detection
mechanism, or other means, to identify the correct one. In
our setup, we quantify the computational complexity of Eve
by the amount of side information Rc bits per channel use
offered to it by a Genie. This side information reduces the
erasure probability to
g = Pr(R0 −Rc > log(1 + heP )), (15)
since now the channel has to supply only enough mutual
information to close the gap between the transmission rate
R0 and the side information Rc. The ML performance can be
obtained as a special case of (15) by setting Rc = 0.
It is now clear that using this idea we have transformed our
ARQ channel into an erasure-wiretap channel, as in Figure 2.
In this equivalent model, we have a noiseless link between
Alice and Bob, ensured by the idealized error detection
algorithm, and an erasure channel between Alice and Eve.
The following result characterizes the achievable performance
over this channel
Lemma 1: The secrecy capacity for the equivalent erasure-
wiretap channel is
Ce = max
R0,P≤P¯
{R0Pr(R0 ≤ log(1 + hbP ))
Pr(R0 −Rc > log(1 + heP ))}. (16)
The proof follows from the classical result on the erasure-
wiretap channel and is omitted here for brevity. It is intuitively
appealing that the expression in Lemma 1 is simply the product
of the transmission rate per channel use, the probability of
successful decoding at Bob, and the probability of erasure
at Eve. The main advantage of this equivalent model is that
it lends itself to the explicit coset LDPC coding scheme
constructed in [5]–[7]. In summary, our first low complexity
construction is a concatenated coding scheme where the outer
code is a coset LDPC for secrecy and the inner one is a
capacity achieving Gaussian code. The underlying memoryless
ARQ is used to create the erasure-wiretap channel matched to
this concatenated coding scheme.
The second step is to limit the decoding delay resulting
from the distribution of key bits over an asymptotically large
number of ARQ blocks in the previous approach. To avoid
this problem, we limit the number of ARQ frames used by
the key to a finite number k. The implication for this choice
is a non-vanishing value for secrecy outage probability, which
is the probability of Eve obtaining correctly all k frames. For
example, if we encode the message as the syndrome of the rate
(k−1)/k parity check code then Eve will be completely blind
about the key if at least one of the k ARQ frames is erased
[5]–[7] (Here the distilled key is the modulo-2 sum of the key
parts received correctly). The secrecy outage probability is
Pout = Pr
(
min
j∈{1,...,k}
log(1 + he(j)P ) > R0 −Rc
)
, (17)
where he(1),...,he(k) are i.i.d. random variables drawn accord-
ing to the distribution of Eve’s channel. Assuming a Rayleigh
fading distribution, we get
Pout = exp
(
− k
P
[
2R0−Rc − 1]) . (18)
Under the same assumption, it is straightforward to see that
the average number of Bernoulli trials required to transfer k
ARQ frames successfully to Bob is given by
N0 = k exp
(
2R0 − 1
P
)
, (19)
resulting in a key rate
Rk =
R0
N0
=
R0
k
exp
(
−2
R0 − 1
P
)
. (20)
Fig. 3. Cs and Ce against SNR for Rc = (0, 3, 7).
Therefore, for a given Rc and P , one can obtain a tradeoff
between Pout and Rk by varying R0. Our third, and final, step
is to relax the assumption of a capacity achieving inner code.
Now, we allow for practical coding schemes, including the
possibility of uncoded transmission, with a finite frame length
n1. Simulation results are reported in the next section.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Throughout this section we assume a Rayleigh fading chan-
nel, for both Bob and Eve, and focus on the symmetric sce-
nario where the average SNRs experienced by both nodes are
the same, i.e., E (hb) = E (he) = 1. Under these assumptions,
the achievable secrecy rate in (6) becomes
Cs = max
R0
exp
(
−2
R0 − 1
P
)
.{
R0 − exp (1/P )loge (2)
[
Ei (1/P )− Ei
(
2R0/P
)]}
(21)
where Ei (x) =
∫∞
x
exp (−t) /t dt.
Figure 3 gives the variation of Cs and Ce with SNR under
different constraints on the decoding capabilities of Eve. It is
clear from the figure that Ce can be greater than Cs. This can
be the case for certain Rc and SNR values. For instance, in
the case of Rc = 0, if Eve receives the transmitted packet
with error, she discards it without any further attempts at
decoding. The instantaneous secrecy rate becomes R0, which
is larger than that used in (6) Cs(i) = R0− log2(1 +he(i)P )
where Cs(i), he(i) are the instantaneous secrecy rate, and
Eve’s channel power gain, respectively. Averaging over all
fading states, we can get a greater Ce than Cs. It is worth
noting that, under the assumptions of the symmetric scenario
and the Rayleigh fading model, the scheme proposed in [4] is
not able to achieve any positive secrecy rate.
Next, we turn our attention to the delay-limited coding
constructions proposed in Section IV. Figures 4 and 5 show,
for different R0 and Rc, the tradeoff between secrecy outage
probability versus key rate for the proposed rate (k−1)/k coset
secrecy coding scheme assuming an optimal inner Gaussian
channel coding. Figure 4 gives key rate corresponding to a
desired secrecy outage probability, given some values for R0
and Rc. As is evident from Figure 5, the key rate required
Fig. 4. Outage probability against key rate for Rc = 2, Ro = 4, 6, 7 and
8, and an average SNR of 30 dB.
to obtain a certain outage probability gets smaller as Rc
increases. In Figure 6, we relax the optimal channel coding
assumption and plot key rate for practical coding schemes
or no coding, and finite frame lengthes (i.e., finite n1). The
code used in the simulation is a punctured convolutional code
derived from a basic 1/2 code with a constraint length of 7 and
generator polynomials 133 and 171 (in octal). We assume that
Eve is Genie-aided and can correct an additional 50 erroneous
symbols (beyond the error correction capability of the channel
code). From the figure, we see that the key rate increases with
increasing SNR and then drops after reaching a peak value.
Note that we fix the transmission rate and make it independent
of SNR. A low SNR means more transmissions to Bob and
a consequent low key rate. As SNR increases, while keeping
the transmission rate fixed, the key rate increases. However,
increasing SNR at Eve’s receiver means an increased ability to
correctly decode the codeword-carrying packets. This explains
why the key rate curves peak and then decay with SNR. Note
also that for a certain modulation and channel coding scheme,
decreasing the packet size in bits lowers the key rate. Reducing
the packet size increases the probability of correct decoding
by Bob and, thus, decreases the number of transmissions.
However, it also increases the probability of correct decoding
by Eve and the overall effect is a decreased key rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper developed a novel overlay approach for sharing
secret keys using existing ARQ protocols. The underlying idea
is to distribute the key bits over multiple ARQ frames and
then use the authenticated ACK/NACK feedback to create a
degraded channel at the eavesdropper. Our results establish
the achievability of non-zero secrecy rates even when the
eavesdropper is experiencing a higher average SNR than the
legitimate receiver. It is worth noting that our approach does
not assume any prior knowledge about the instantaneous CSI;
only prior knowledge of the highest average SNR seen by
the eavesdropper is needed. Moreover, we constructed a low
complexity secrecy coding scheme by transforming our chan-
nel to an erasure wiretap channel which lends itself to explicit
coset coding approaches. Our theoretical claims were validated
via numerical examples that demonstrate the efficiency of the
Fig. 5. Outage probability against key rate for R0 = 10, Rc = 3, 4, 5 and
7, and an average SNR of 30 dB.
Fig. 6. The key rates required to obtain an outage of 10−10 against SNR
for different packet sizes, Kb = 240 and 480 bits, and different modulation
schemes: uncoded BPSK, coded BPSK, and coded QPSK.
proposed schemes. The most interesting part of our work
is, perhaps, the fact that it demonstrates the possibility of
sharing secret keys in wireless networks via rather simple
modifications of the existing infrastructure which, in our case,
corresponds to the ARQ mechanism.
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